Standard

Specifies general definitions for low-speed serial data communication up to 125 kbit/s for road vehicle applications. The object is to define the general architecture of the communication network and the content of the data link layer and the physical layer for transmission between the different types of electronic modules on board road vehicles. Parts 2, 3 and 4 are entirely independent.

ISO 24100:2010, 3.3. Intelligent transport systems::Basic principles for personal data protection in probe vehicle information services

ISO/TR 17427-9:2015, 2.5.Intelligent transport systems::Cooperative ITS::Part 9: Compliance and enforcement aspects

Smart parking lots (SPLs) integrate parking information to enable the coordination of parking facilities within smart cities. SPLs work with other systems to provide various parking services. This Recommendation specifies the requirements and functional architecture for SPLs. The scope of this Recommendation includes: introduction of SPLs; requirements for SPL; Functional architecture of SPL. For use cases of SPL see Appendix I. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.

Cryptographic and data authentication procedures for storage devices that support length expansion, such as tape drives, are specified. Such procedures include the following cryptographic modes of operation for the AES block cipher: CCM, GCM, CBC-HMAC, and XTS-HMAC.

EME2-AES and XCB-AES wide-block encryption with associated data (EAD) modes of the NIST AES block cipher, providing usage guidelines and test vectors, are described. A wide block encryption algorithm behaves as a single block cipher with a large plaintext input and ciphertext output, but uses a narrow block cipher [in this case Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)] internally. These encryption modes are oriented toward random access storage devices that do not provide authentication, but need to reduce the granularity of a potential attack.

The purpose of this protocol is to validate the safety skill “maintain safe distance” by measurement. Its scope is limited to Highly Automated Agricultural Machines (HAAM). In this context, the skill “maintain safe distance” is often used to protect workers from injuries caused by collisions where the HAAM collides with a part of the human. The protocol validates that the stopping distance is never exceeded in a HAAM system when using a safety skill that detect objects and triggers a stop. The validation of this protocol requires that the reader has a distance measuring system available.

Discovery, authentication, and authorization protocols between hosts and storage devices over multiple transports are defined in this standard.

The functions and features to be provided in intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) to accommodate critical infrastructure protection programs are defined in this standard. Security regarding the access, operation, configuration, firmware revision and data retrieval from an IED are addressed. Communications for the purpose of power system protection (teleprotection) are not addressed in this standard.

The enhanced security management function for the protocol defined in IEEE 1888(TM), “Ubiquitous Green Community Control Network Protocol,” is described in this standard. Security requirements, system security architecture definitions, and a standardized description of authentication and authorization, along with security procedures and protocols, are specified. This standard can help avoid unintended data disclosure to the public and unauthorized access to resources, while providing enhanced integrity and confidentiality of transmitted data in the ubiquitous green community control network.

Specific configuration requirements within the relevant Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) for implementation of the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol suite within a utility control system are identified in this standard. It is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to implementing IPsec. Promoting interoperability between products developed by different vendors is the primary goal in developing this standard. Configuration parameters needed to support the establishment and sustained operation of an IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel between two devices which have implemented IPsec conforming to this standard are the focus of this standard. Minimizing configuration errors involving IPsec implementations within utility control systems is a secondary goal of this standard. Product agnosticism and applicability to any device (e.g., router, substation gateway, intelligent electronic device, etc.) is the intent of this standard, within the utility control system as the end user deems necessary for their unique system architecture.

This guide describes recommended practices for the physical security of electric power substations. It is designed to address a number of threats, including unauthorized access to substation facilities, theft of material, and vandalism. It describes options for positive access control, monitoring of facilities, and delay/deter features which could be employed to mitigate these threats. This guide also establishes options for different levels of physical security for electric power substations. The guide does not establish recommendations based on voltage levels, size or any depiction of criticality of the substation. The user will make these decisions based on threat assessment and criticality assignment by the substation owner. Overt attacks against the substation for the purpose of destroying its capability to operate, such as explosives, projectiles, vehicles, etc. are beyond the scope of this guide.